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 i 
ABSTRACT 
 
Juror impartiality is necessary for a fair and just legal system, but is true juror impartiality 
realistic? The current study investigated the role of implicit and explicit social-cognitive 
biases in jurors’ conceptualizations of insanity, and the influence of those biases in juror 
verdict decisions. It was hypothesized that by analyzing the role of implicit and explicit 
biases in insanity defense cases, jurors’ attitudes towards those with mental illnesses and 
attitudes towards the insanity defense would influence jurors’ final verdict decisions. 
Two hundred and two participants completed an online survey which included a trial 
vignette incorporating an insanity defense (adapted from Maeder et al., 2016), the 
Insanity Defense Attitude Scale (Skeem, Louden, & Evans, 2004), Community Attitudes 
Towards the Mentally Ill Scale (Taylor & Dear, 1981), and an Implicit Association Test 
(Greenwald et al., 1998). While implicit associations concerning mental illness and 
dangerousness were significantly related to mock jurors’ verdicts, they no longer were 
when explicit insanity defense attitudes were added to a more complex model including 
all measured attitudes and biases. Insanity defense attitudes were significantly related to 
jurors’ verdicts over and above attitudes about the mentally ill and implicit biases 
concerning the mentally ill. The potentially biasing impact of jurors’ insanity defense 
attitudes and the impact of implicit associations about the mentally ill in legal judgments 
are discussed.  
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 1 
  “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed…” (U.S. Constitution, Amendment VI, emphasis added). Although the 
law requires impartiality in criminal cases, true impartiality has been acknowledged by 
scholars as difficult for both juries and judges to attain (Nadelhoffer, 2006; Bassett & 
Perschbacher, 2011). People – jurors included – constantly take in information from the 
environment, and this information affects how we make decisions and form judgments. 
The environment, in this case, is an extremely broad term encompassing the constant 
stream of information from the world around us that affects how we interpret things. To 
assume that jurors are able to enter the courtroom and forget any preconceived 
knowledge or fundamental beliefs, which would need to occur for true impartiality, is not 
possible (Nadelhoffer, 2006). However, by identifying the existence of previous beliefs, 
stereotypes, and prejudices that systematically bias jurors, methods can be developed to 
aid in reducing their reliance on outside information in their legal decision making that 
may hinder the right to a fair trial. 
One area in which jurors’ preconceived knowledge and attitudes can affect their 
judgments is in the case of the insanity defense. While the insanity defense may differ by 
jurisdiction, one key feature in all legal standards for insanity is the existence of a mental 
disease or defect that influences the defendant’s behaviors in a way that their ability to 
understand the crime or the wrongness of their crime is impaired (Huss, 2013). The 
insanity defense requires jurors to decide whether the defendant, at the time of the crime, 
met the legal definition of insanity (e.g., Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, or NGRI). A 
person adjudicated NGRI is not held criminally responsible for their actions and is treated 
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rather than punished. They receive treatment in a state hospital until they are deemed no 
longer mentally ill or dangerous, in which case they may be released back into society 
(Huss, 2013).  
Public Conceptions of Insanity 
 In 1982, John Hinckley Jr. was found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity after he 
attempted to assassinate then President Ronald Reagan (Hans & Slater, 1984). Public 
outcry followed, with demands for reform in the use of insanity verdicts to make it harder 
for people to “get away with” crimes while insane. Hans and Slater found that there were 
differences in the public’s understanding of the NGRI verdict based on education, gender, 
race, and general media consumption, with jurors who received more education defining 
insanity with fewer colloquialisms (e.g., “crazed”) than those with lower levels of 
education. 
 An understanding of the verdict and the outcome is also important when 
considering how jurors form judgments in criminal cases. Sloat and Frierson (2005) 
surveyed discharged jurors from the South Carolina court system to gauge their 
knowledge about insanity verdicts. They found that only 4.2% (n = 96) of their sample 
were able to correctly define insanity defense verdicts. It should be noted that these jurors 
were not given information prior to completing this survey on insanity verdicts by the 
researchers, and therefore relied solely on previous knowledge when asked to define the 
insanity verdict.  
Juror Attitudes and Judgments of Insanity 
There is a growing body of literature on the role of juror attitudes in judgments of 
insanity. Negative attitudes toward the insanity defense are associated with positive 
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attitudes towards the death penalty, higher perceptions of the overuse of the insanity 
defense, and favoring punishment over treatment (Bailis et al., 1995; Bloechl et al., 
2007). Juror attitudes towards the insanity defense and perceptions of insanity may also 
be related to jurors’ previous knowledge. Prototypes, a generalized cognitive construct 
used for item categorization based on similar group characteristics (Cohen & Murphy, 
1984; Rosch, 1975), are intrinsic in helping jurors form judgments by associations with 
preconceived knowledge.  
Prototype theory was first described by cognitive psychologists as category 
membership based upon similar characteristics and meanings (Rosch, 1975). While there 
have been challenges to prototype theory as it applies to complex situations (see Cohen & 
Murphy, 1984), there are direct implications surrounding prototype theory that are 
applicable to legal concepts. Smith (1991) found that jurors’ prior representations 
(previous knowledge) not only influenced how jurors define what constitutes a crime, but 
that they rely on prototypes when they are lacking instructions, and form judgments 
based on how similar a crime is to the general prototype of that crime. It has been found 
that juror prototypes are a significant indicator of attitudes toward the insanity defense 
(Skeem & Golding, 2001), and juror attitudes towards the insanity defense are strongly 
connected with jurors choosing the insanity verdict in general (Louden & Skeem, 2007). 
Similar to the findings about jurors’ inability to accurately define insanity, theoretical 
underpinnings for jurors’ understandings of insanity via prototype theory do not fully 
explain how jurors form their opinions and ultimately make their verdicts in insanity 
cases. Juror attitudes about the insanity defense seem to be more predictive than 
conceptions and prototypes of insanity in regard to insanity verdict decisions (Louden & 
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Skeem, 2007). Attitudes are commonly discussed in the same context as bias (e.g., 
Bloechl et al., 2007), and measures have been designed to hone in on explicit attitudes 
toward the insanity defense (e.g., IDA-R; Skeem, Louden, & Evans, 2004). However, 
implicit, or subconscious, biases that jurors may have towards the insanity defense have 
not been examined to date.  
Explicit Social-Cognitive Biases 
Explicit biases affect people’s behaviors, decisions, and judgments in ways in 
which they are aware (Greenwald & Krieger, 2006, p.946). Explicit bias measures are 
commonly self-report assessments or questionnaires and have been shown to be effective 
in predicting participants’ behaviors. For example, Dovidio, Kawakami, and Gaertner 
(2002) administered explicit measures of racial prejudice to a sample of White 
participants and then examined the extent to which explicit prejudice scores predicted 
observers’ perceptions of participants’ verbal and nonverbal friendliness. They found that 
explicit prejudice scores predicted less friendly verbal behaviors. Thus, Dovidio and 
colleagues (2002) demonstrated a link between a commonly-used racial bias 
questionnaire and verbal behaviors, supporting the real-world applicability of explicit 
bias measures.      
In regard to the insanity defense, explicit biases can be discussed in two ways: 
biases against the mentally ill in general, and bias against the use of the insanity defense. 
Taylor and Dear (1981) developed the Community Attitudes Toward the Mentally Ill 
(CAMI) scale in order to support the growing need to gauge general attitudes (or biases) 
towards the mentally ill as deinstitutionalization became commonplace. 
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Deinstitutionalization occurred in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, and 
transferred the duty of care for mentally ill patients from treatment facilities to more 
community-based programs (Steadman, Monahan, Duffee, & Hartstone, 1984). However, 
community-based programs were underfunded and largely ineffective in treating the 
mentally ill, and deinstitutionalization has been associated with an increase in the number 
of severely mentally ill homeless persons and an increase in the prison population (Lamb 
& Bachrach, 2001). 
While bias against the mentally ill is a pervasive societal issue, there have been 
notable differences in levels of bias held by those of different genders, races, and 
education level. Corrigan and Watson (2007) found that women attached less stigma than 
men to those with physical and mental health conditions (specifically schizophrenia, 
substance abuse, or emphysema), although there was not a significant effect for type of 
health condition found within the sample. Women were also more likely than men to pity 
those with the above health conditions, held less blame than men for having those 
conditions, and indicated that they would be less likely to avoid people with those 
conditions. Non-White participants were less likely than White participants to pity those 
with health conditions (e.g., people dependent on drugs) and to view people with those 
conditions as more dangerous. While there was a significant effect for education and 
stigmatization of the mentally ill, this effect seemed to be driven by perceptions of 
dangerousness; those with more education perceived those with the health conditions as 
less dangerous.  
Schomerus and colleagues (2012) completed a meta-analytic review spanning the 
mental health literature between 1950 and 2011 in order to determine if attitudes about 
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mental illness by the community have improved over time. Studies that were included 
were required to have collected data at multiple time points while inquiring about 
attitudes about mental illness, and surveyed the general population (i.e., not special 
populations like medical professionals). Sixteen studies, which were conducted across 
multiple countries, were included in the meta-analysis. In general, there was a better 
understanding of what constitutes mental illness at the societal level when compared to 
past levels of knowledge about mental illness, but attitudes towards those with mental 
illnesses (schizophrenia, but not depression) have grown less favorable (Schomerus et al., 
2012).  
There are also cultural differences that have been associated with mental illness 
stigma. In a global survey of 596,712 participants from 229 countries, there seem to be 
differences in views on mental illness between developed and developing countries 
(Seeman, Tang, Brown & Ing, 2016). Although statistical analyses were not included in 
the report to determine if there were significant between-group differences, only 7-8% of 
those from developed countries believed that those with mental illnesses were violent 
compared to 15-16% from developing countries. When asked about the similarity 
between physical and mental illnesses, those in developed countries (45-51% of 
participants) compared to developing countries (12-15% of participants) were more likely 
to report that they viewed both types of illness as similar to one another (Seeman et al., 
2016). 
As previously mentioned, in order to be deemed insane there must be some type 
of mental illness present upon commission of the crime. Bloechl et al. (2006) point out 
the potential for biases against the insanity defense itself, referencing Hans’ 1986 study 
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that observed the potential for the insanity defense to be misconstrued by biased jurors as 
being a loophole verdict. Loophole verdicts may be perceived by jurors as ways of 
“getting away” with a crime. There have been observed effects on jurors’ decisions in 
insanity cases when jurors’ attitudes about insanity are taken into account.  
Louden and Skeem (2007) found insanity defense attitudes have a large influence 
on jurors’ general information processing. These attitudes are integral in the decision-
making process, so much so that they influence the behaviors of jurors when they are 
tasked with making a verdict decision. Hans and Slater (1984) documented the 
differences the lay public has in defining insanity, which leads to the potential for jurors 
to rely on biased information to form their judgments. While Hans and Slater (1984) 
show the influence of the media and biases against mental illness on lay-people’s 
perceptions of insanity, these are self-formulated definitions any juror may bring into the 
courtroom, leading to the potential of a biased verdict choice. It is important to 
understand the basis for these biases in order to determine if there are feasible ways to 
limit the use of preconceived knowledge that may influence juror decision-making 
processes. 
Implicit Social-Cognitive Biases 
Implicit biases, in contrast to explicit biases, are attitudes that can affect 
behaviors, decisions, and judgments without conscious thought (Greenwald & Krieger, 
2006). Greenwald and Banaji’s classic 1995 paper on implicit cognition reflects the idea 
that previously learned information or attitudes unconsciously affect behaviors and 
responses to stimuli. This paper formed the initial foundation for a research program on 
implicit biases as well. The existence of implicit cognition, Greenwald and Banaji (1995) 
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argued, required the development of measures that were capable of measuring 
unconscious cognitive constructs. Implicit cognitions are not measureable using self-
report measures as they are outside of conscious awareness.  
The Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998) was developed to 
measure unconscious attitudes towards certain stimuli key to various constructs and 
social psychological concepts.  The IAT measures unconscious implicit cognitive 
attitudes without requiring a conscious, self-report component (Greenwald, Nosek, & 
Banaji, 2003). The IAT is based upon reaction time and accuracy, and is designed to 
measure automatic responses to stimuli. The IAT has many iterations measuring various 
socially-relevant concepts such as racial bias (Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998), 
bias against the mentally ill (Teachman, Wilson, & Komarovskaya, 2006), self-esteem 
(Greenwald & Farnham, 2000), gender self-concept (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000), 
biases towards people of different religions (Rudman, Greenwald, Mellott & Schwartz, 
1999) and anti-fat bias (Teachman, Gapinski, Brownell, Rawlins & Jeyaram, 2000). 
Implicit biases have been extensively studied in regard to racial bias. For 
example, Correll and colleagues (2014) have used a measure called the First-Person 
Shooter Task to investigate implicit racial bias. In this task, participants view a series of 
photographs and must quickly determine whether the person in each photo is holding a 
gun or a harmless everyday object (e.g., cell phone, wallet). On each trial of the task, they 
are instructed to make a split-second decision of whether to shoot the person (if the 
person pictured is holding a gun) or not (if the person is holding a harmless object). 
Implicit racial bias is reflected in the pattern of decision errors that participants tend to 
make. Participants who endorse negative racial stereotypes linking African Americans 
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with weapons and crime are especially likely to mistake a harmless object held by an 
African American person for a gun and make the (erroneous) decision to shoot (Correll et 
al., 2004).  
Implicit biases have been recognized as a problem in the courtroom by both legal 
and non-legal experts (Kang et al., 2012; Roberts, 2012). Implicit biases have been 
observed in juries (e.g., racial bias, Kang et al., 2012), and judges (e.g., racial bias, 
Rachlinksi, Johnson, Wistrich & Guthrie, 2009). Given previous research linking explicit 
juror attitudes and biases to their decisions in insanity cases (Louden & Skeem, 2007), 
and research showing that implicit attitudes affect people’s behaviors even beyond their 
explicit attitudes (e.g., Correll et al., 2014), there is a need to determine whether implicit 
social-cognitive biases play an important - and distinct - role in jurors’ judgments of 
insanity. I was unable to find any previous studies of implicit biases related to insanity 
defense judgments, which forms the foundation of the current study. 
Pilot Study 
In August 2016, our research lab conducted an initial pilot study to look at the 
role of insanity defense attitudes, perceptions of the degree of mental illness of the 
defendant, and cultural worldview differences between mock jurors on whether or not 
jurors would choose an insanity defense verdict option. A sample of 188 (n = 182 after 
manipulation checks, 51.4% male) participants between the ages of 21 and 61 (M = 
34.18, SD = 9.12) from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk were asked to read a vignette 
depicting a second-degree murder case in which the defendant raised the insanity defense 
(the case was adapted with permission from Maeder, McLaughlin, Yamamoto, & 
Zannella, 2016). Participants were asked to decide on their verdict after reading the 
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vignette, to complete the Insanity Defense Attitude Scale- Revised (IDA-R; Skeem, 
Louden, & Evans, 2004), the Cultural Cognition Worldview Scale (CWS; Kahan et al., 
2010), and basic demographic information. The IDA-R measures people’s explicit 
attitudes toward the insanity defense.  
We found that higher support for the insanity defense (measured using the IDA-
R) was associated with a higher likelihood of choosing the insanity verdict option 
compared to a verdict of guilty, b = 0.51, SE = 0.01, Wald (1) = 24.67, p <.001. This 
positive relation is an indicator that mock jurors’ explicit attitudes are systematically 
related to judgments of guilt, with more positive attitudes toward the insanity defense 
associated with an increased likelihood of choosing an insanity verdict.  
Current Study 
The current study extends previous research on juror attitudes towards the 
insanity defense and jurors’ propensity to assign an insanity verdict. Similar to the pilot 
study, the current study used common measures of attitudes towards the insanity defense 
and biases against the mentally ill in order to determine if biases, both explicit and 
implicit, are predictive of jurors choosing the insanity verdict. This study contributes to 
research on the impartiality of jurors by identifying factors that bias jurors’ judgments 
and threaten the sanctity of the ideal legal system.  This study also uniquely contributes to 
the literature on the role of implicit biases in juror decisions about the insanity defense.   
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1. Jurors’ implicit social-cognitive attitudes toward people with 
mental illness (measured by the Implicit Association Test (IAT; stimuli from Teachman, 
Wilson, & Komarovskaya, 2006) will systematically affect their verdicts. Consistent with 
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research showing some people hold stigmatizing attitudes toward the mentally ill (e.g., 
Corrigan & Watson, 2007), we expect that jurors with more implicit bias against the 
mentally ill (who score higher - positive d-scores - on the IAT) will be more likely to 
choose a more punitive verdict (Guilty) than the insanity verdict.   
Hypothesis 2.  Jurors’ explicit social-cognitive attitudes will systematically affect 
their verdicts.  
2a. Explicit social-cognitive attitudes towards people with mental illness (as 
measured by the Community Attitudes towards the Mentally Ill Scale, Taylor & Dear, 
1981) will predict jurors’ overall verdicts. Specifically, people with more negative, 
restrictive attitudes towards the mentally ill (CAMI), will be more likely to choose the 
more punitive guilty verdict than the insanity verdict option. 
2b. Replicating our findings from the initial pilot study, jurors’ explicit social-
cognitive attitudes towards the insanity defense (measured using the IDA-R) will be 
directly related to jurors choosing the insanity verdict option. Specifically, jurors with 
higher support toward the insanity defense will be more likely to choose the insanity 
verdict, whereas jurors with lower support toward the insanity defense will be more likely 
to choose the guilty verdict option. 
2c. Explicit attitudes toward people with mental illness and toward the insanity 
defense are expected to overlap.  Participants with higher authoritarian and socially 
restrictive attitudes toward people with mental illness (CAMI) will also have more 
explicitly negative attitudes about the insanity defense (IDA-R).  
Hypothesis 3. The relationship between insanity defense attitudes and verdict 
decisions will be moderated by performance on the Implicit Association Test. One of the 
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most important aspects of the definition of insanity is the existence of a mental illness, 
and people who believe dangerousness and mental illness are linked (via implicit biases) 
are hypothesized to be less likely to choose the insanity verdict.  
Hypothesis 4. Taking into account both implicit bias (IAT) and explicit bias 
measures (CAMI, IDA-R), a significantly higher proportion of the variance in jurors’ 
insanity verdict decisions will be accounted for as compared to the variance accounted 
for by implicit bias measures or explicit bias measures alone. While there may not be a 
strong relation between the explicit bias and implicit bias measures (see Teachman et al., 
2006), the measures will each contribute unique variance and together will contribute to a 
substantial portion of the variance in jurors’ verdict decisions. 
Method 
Participants 
Two hundred and eighteen participants were recruited via SONA Research 
Participation Systems between October 2017 and January 2018 (https://asuw.sona-
systems.com/). SONA is a credit-based system used by Universities around the world to 
facilitate the recruitment of student and community participants in research studies for 
payment or credit (Sona Systems, 2017). Research credits are awarded based upon the 
completion of studies by students in courses normally related to their area of study, which 
may be necessary for a percentage of points in the course. Participants received two 
research participation credits upon completion of the study. Sixteen participants were 
removed from the final sample after failing the attention check question (“Please choose 
option two” in a multiple-choice question). This brought the final sample size to 202. The 
sample was primarily female (73.8%) and white/Caucasian (50.5%). Participants ranged 
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in age from 18 to 52, with a mean age of 22.17 (SD=4.73, N=200). The majority of the 
sample (94.1%) had never served on a jury. Further demographic information can be 
found in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Final Sample Demographic Information 
 Total Percentage 
 
Gender (N = 202) 
Male 
Female 
N/A 
 
 
52  
149  
1  
 
 
25.7% 
73.8% 
0.5% 
Race (N = 202) 
White/Caucasian 
Hispanic (Non-White) 
Hispanic (White) 
Black/African American 
Asian (Not Specified) 
Middle-Eastern 
Pacific Islander 
Native American 
Caribbean American 
Mixed Race 
Other (Not Specified) 
 
102 
34 
18 
16 
14 
6 
1 
1 
1 
8 
1 
 
50.5% 
16.8% 
8.9% 
7.9% 
6.9% 
3.0% 
0.5% 
0.5% 
0.5% 
4.0% 
0.5% 
Political Affiliation (N = 202) 
Democrat 
Republican 
Independent  
Libertarian 
Other (N/A or Not Affiliated) 
 
 
90 
31 
59 
11 
11 
 
44.6% 
15.4% 
29.2% 
5.4% 
5.4% 
Prior Jury Service (N = 202) 
Yes 
No 
 
12 
190 
 
 
5.9% 
94.1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 14 
Measures 
Demographics and Verdict Questionnaire. The demographics form consisted of 
questions related to the participant’s age, race, and gender, and questions asking about 
attitudes towards the death penalty, previous jury participation, and political affiliation.  
 The verdict questionnaire was nearly identical to the questionnaire used in the 
pilot study, and asked questions such as “To what degree do you think the defendant has 
a mental illness?” (0-100% scale). Other questions asked about evidence strength, the 
existence of reasonable doubt, and the participants’ verdict.  
Insanity Defense Attitudes Scale-Revised (Skeem et al. 2004). The Insanity 
Defense Attitudes Scale- Revised (IDA-R) was developed to understand explicit attitudes 
towards the insanity defense, while also validating previous measures that had been 
linked to insanity defense attitudes. The IDA-R is designed to measure common 
misconceptions about the insanity defense (e.g. “Many of the crazy criminals that 
psychiatrists see fit to return to the streets go on to kill again”), as well as participants’ 
attitudes towards legal concepts of insanity (e.g. “I believe that we should punish a 
person for a criminal act only if he understood the act as evil and then freely chose to do 
it”).  
  The IDA-R consists of 22 statements rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale.  It has 
two subscales: injustice and danger (I-D) and strict liability (SL). The I-D subscale 
"reflects the extent to which individuals perceive that the insanity defense is misused” 
and the SL subscale “reflects the extent to which individuals believe that mental illness is 
associated with reduced capacity for rational decision making and control” (Skeem et al., 
2004, p. 629). Skeem and colleagues have shown that both subscales are internally 
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consistent (I-D Subscale: a = .90, SL Subscale: a = .80), and are moderately related to 
jurors’ judgments of insanity in mock trial vignettes (specifically the SL subscale at r = 
.45 to -.60 depending on the vignette, p < .01). IDA-R total scores, calculated by 
combining both of the subscales, were also consistently related to case judgments (r = .53 
to .59 across vignettes) as well as in ratings of insanity (r = -.49 to -.61 across vignettes) 
(Skeem et al., 2004).  
 Community Attitudes Towards the Mentally Ill (Taylor & Dear, 1981). The 
Community Attitudes Towards the Mentally Ill (CAMI) scale was designed to measure 
communal acceptance of those with mental illnesses, as well as to gauge attitudes about 
resources available for the mentally ill within the community. The Authoritarianism (A) 
subscale generally focuses on the amount of control society has on containing those with 
mental illnesses, the Benevolence (B) subscale focuses on personal feelings towards 
helping the mentally ill, and Social Restrictiveness (SR) gauges attitudes about the threat 
and normalcy of mental illnesses in the community. The Community Mental Health 
Ideology (CMHI) subscale asks participants questions regarding community services and 
attitudes towards mental health facilities within the community (Taylor & Dear, 1981). 
The CAMI consists of 40 total items (10 for each subscale) and responses are 
given using a 5-point Likert scale for each statement. Each of the subscales have 
moderate-high reliability (a = .68 - .88; Taylor & Dear, 1981). Subscale intercorrelations 
were also moderate-high in previous studies (r = -.63 to -.77). Taylor and Dear found that 
individual differences such as age (older, “less sympathy” towards mentally ill), gender 
(females more “sympathetic” than males), marital status (married and widowed “less 
sympathetic”), and number of children (those with children less than 18 years old are less 
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sympathetic) were related to attitudes towards the mentally ill. The CAMI has been used 
in the past to observe the relationship between communal attitudes about mental illness 
and juror verdicts with mixed results (e.g., non-significant findings in Jung, 2015; 
significant findings in Cotrone, 2016). 
 Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwarz, 1998; 
Teachman, Wilson, & Komarovskaya, 2006). An adaptation of the IAT that focuses on 
attitudes towards those with mental illnesses (Teachman et al., 2006) was used in this 
study as an implicit measure of attitudes about the mentally ill. This version of the IAT 
measures the extent to which participants show an implicit bias linking dangerousness of 
those with mental illnesses and physical illnesses.  
Two sets of words appear on a computer screen across multiple trials. One word 
(or set of words) will pertain to either physical or mental illness (e.g. mentally ill people, 
physically ill people, bipolar disorder, appendicitis). The second word (or set of words) 
will pertain to either harm or danger (e.g., harmless, dangerous, violent, gentle). In 
different phases of the IAT, participants are given different decision rules (e.g., press a 
specific key on the keyboard if what they see on the screen represents the pairing of a 
mental illness concept with words relating to danger or a pairing of a physical illness 
concept with words relating to harmlessness). The word pairings that generate faster 
reaction times are indicative of an implicit (automatic) association between those two 
categories. That is, participants who can more quickly identify the pairing of a mental 
health concept with danger than harmlessness are presumably able to do so because they 
have an underlying attitude linking mental illness with dangerousness.  
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 In previous research, people’s average responses on this variation of the IAT have 
shown that people’s attitudes tend to be more negative towards the mentally ill than the 
physically ill (t116 = 4.60, p < .0001; Teachman et al., 2006). No relation was found 
between explicit bias measures of similar constructs with this variation of the IAT, but 
Teachman and colleagues (2006) reported that this was not unexpected, as it may be an 
indicator that different components of the same construct were being measured.  
While there was no way to gauge the reliability of this version of the IAT, there has been 
a meta-analytic review of various types of IATs to determine the mean predictive validity 
that can be attributed to the IAT with various behaviors and prejudices observable in the 
real world, such as racial bias, biases associated with political affiliation, and gender 
biases (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). According to Greenwald and 
colleagues (2009), the mean for 184 independent samples (ranging across various topics) 
was r = .27.  Greenwald and colleagues (2009) focused on studies with the IAT 
predicting outcomes on “measures of physical actions, judgments, preferences expressed 
as choices, and physiological reactions” (p. 19).  
An IAT was created for this study using the IAT generator on 
https://iatgen.wordpress.com/ (Carpenter et al., 2018), with category and stimuli labels 
provided by Dr. Bethany Teachman with permission (IAT labels from and used in 
Teachman, Wilson, & Komarovskaya, 2006). Participants were instructed to match the 
stimuli words to the main category labels using the e and i keys on their keyboard. There 
were 20 practice trials and 40 “real” trials which were used for data analysis. In 
accordance with Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003), as well as the IATgen Data 
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Cleaning/Analysis Web app (Carpenter et al., 2018) and R Script for analyzing IATgen 
IAT Data (Carpenter et al., 2018), participants that have 10% or more trials that were less 
than 300 ms were not included in data analysis. 
Procedures 
 Participants were recruited through ASU West’s SONA Research Participation 
Systems upon approval from the ASU Institutional Review Board (Appendix A). 
Participants completed the study online through Qualtrics, an online-hosted survey 
platform. Participants were provided with a participant information sheet with informed 
consent information, the study procedures, the risks and benefits of participation, the 
basic age/citizenship requirements to participate, and clear instructions that they may stop 
the study at any time without penalty. Upon providing informed consent, participants 
were directed to read the 14-page second-degree murder insanity trial vignette (the same 
vignette used in the pilot; Appendix B; Maeder, et al., 2016). This vignette was adapted 
to reflect the legal standards in the United States, as it was originally written in the 
context of the Canadian legal system. After reading the vignette, participants were given 
all of the measures to complete in a randomized order to avoid order effects (see 
Appendix C). After participants completed the study, they were re-directed to the SONA 
platform and automatically awarded 2 research participation credits.   
Results 
Analysis Information and Exclusion Criteria 
 For all analyses that include logistic regression, 0 is coded as NGRI (Insanity) and 
1 is coded as Guilty. This was done to aid in the interpretation of results based on the a 
priori framing of our hypotheses. Those that chose the Not Guilty verdict were excluded 
 
 
 19 
from analyses due to the low number of Not Guilty verdicts and because our research 
questions revolved around the systematic differences between guilty and insanity verdict 
choices. Due to the small number of participants that chose Not Guilty (N = 8), there was 
the potential for regression coefficients to be inflated when comparing between the 
groups in a multinomial logistic regression. Participants that did not answer the attention 
check question correctly were removed from all analyses (16 participants). Participant 
data was excluded from an analysis if they were missing data on at least one measure 
(list-wise deletion).  
Scale and Test Reliability 
Reliability analyses showed moderate to high internal consistency for all scales 
and subscales (See: Table 2). The Implicit Association Test (IAT) showed no significant 
difference between the category-target stimuli conditions (reaction time and correct 
responses for compatible vs. incompatible pairs), t (197) = 0.15, p = .88.  
Table 2 
Sample size, Means, Standard Deviations, and Reliability Analyses 
  N M SD 
Cronbach’s	
Alpha 
IAT D-Score  202 0.01 0.46 0.83 
IDA-R (19 items) 202 67.26 19.79 0.92 
CAMI     
Authoritarianism (10 items) 199 2.39 0.48 0.62 
Benevolence (10 items) 196 4.03 0.58 0.85 
Community Mental Health Ideology 
(10 items) 199 3.59 0.62 0.86 
Social Restrictiveness (10 items) 199 2.3 0.56 0.77 
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Scale and subscale correlations ranged from low (r =.15) to high (r = .80), which 
could influence the interpretation of some analyses due to multicollinearity (See: Table 3; 
Limitations). 
Table 3 
Correlation Matrix (N = 187)  
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. IDA-R Total Score -      
2. IAT D-Score (Z-
Transformed) .15* -     
3. CAMI Authoritarianism .54** .16* -    
4. CAMI Benevolence -.48** -.23** -.70** -   
5. CAMI Social 
Restrictiveness .47** .18* .76** -.70** -  
6. CAMI Community 
Mental Health Ideology -.51** -.16* -.72** .72** -.80** - 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
 Hypothesis 1. To determine if jurors’ implicit attitudes toward people with 
mental illness were predictive of jurors’ verdict choice, a binary logistic regression was 
completed. IAT d-scores (z-transformed) were entered as the independent variable and 
verdict (guilty vs. insanity) as the dependent variable. Goodness of Fit indices indicate 
that this model fit significantly better than the null model (c2(1) = 7.63, p = .01). 
Consistent with the hypothesis that higher implicit bias against the mentally ill 
would be associated with jurors’ greater likelihood of choosing a guilty verdict as 
compared to the insanity verdict, each 1 unit increase in jurors' scores on the IAT was 
associated with a 1.5 times greater likelihood of choosing the guilty verdict. Participants 
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that scored higher on the IAT (positive scores show a faster association between mental 
illness and dangerousness) were more likely to choose a verdict of guilty instead of NGRI 
(b= .41, SE= 0.15, Exp(B)=1.51, Wald CHI(1)=7.26, p = .01). 
Hypothesis 2a. To determine if people with more negative, restrictive attitudes 
towards the mentally ill were more likely to choose the guilty verdict, a multiple logistic 
regression was completed. The four CAMI subscale scores were entered as independent 
variables and verdict (guilty vs. insanity) was entered as the dependent variable. 
Goodness of Fit indices indicate that this model fits significantly better than that of the 
null model (c2(4) = 24.44, p < .001).  When controlling for responses on the other 
subscales, participants’ scores on the CMHI subscale significantly predicted their choice 
of a guilty verdict (B= -.96, SE= 0.48, Exp(B)= .38, Wald CHI(1)=3.95, p = .05). This 
indicates that with a 1 unit increase in CMHI scores (more favorable views about the 
mentally ill being integrated into their communities), participants were .38 times more 
likely to choose a verdict of Guilty. The three other subscales did not significantly predict 
jurors’ verdicts (p = .17-.98).  
In order to make this finding more interpretable, the Guilty and NGRI verdict 
variable was recoded so that 1 indicated a verdict of NGRI and 0 indicated a verdict of 
Guilty. When controlling for responses on the other subscales, participants’ scores on the 
CMHI subscale significantly predicted their choice of Not Guilty verdict (B= .96, SE= 
0.48, Exp(B)= 2.60, Wald CHI(1)=3.95, p = .05). With a 1 unit increase in scores on the 
CMHI (more favorable views about the mentally ill being integrated into people’s 
communities), participants were 2.6 times more likely to choose a verdict of NGRI.  
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Hypothesis 2b. To determine if jurors’ explicit social-cognitive attitudes towards 
the insanity defense were related to jurors choosing the insanity verdict option, a binary 
logistic regression was completed. IDA-R total scores were entered as the independent 
variable and jurors’ verdicts (Guilty vs. Insanity) were entered as the dependent variable. 
Goodness of fit indices indicate that this model fits significantly better than that of the 
null model (c2(1) = 77.57, p < .001). Participants’ scores on the IDA-R significantly 
predicted their choice of a guilty verdict (B= .09, SE= 0.01, Exp(B)= 1.09, Wald 
CHI(1)=46.98, p < .001, Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 = .44). With a 1 unit increase in jurors' 
scores on the IDAR, participants were 1.09 times more likely to choose a verdict of 
Guilty. More specifically, participants that scored higher on the IDAR (negative attitudes 
towards ID) were more likely to choose a verdict of guilty than NGRI. Pseudo R2 
estimates indicate that 44% of the variability in verdict choice is due to scores on the 
IDA-R.   
Hypothesis 2c.  To determine if participants with more authoritarian and socially 
restrictive attitudes toward people with mental illness (CAMI) will also have more 
explicitly negative attitudes about the insanity defense (IDA-R), a multiple regression 
analysis was completed. The four CAMI subscale scores were entered as the predictors, 
and the total score on the IDA-R was entered as the outcome variable. The CAMI 
subscales significantly predicted scores on the IDA-R (F(4, 185) = 23.03, p < .001, R2 = 
.33). However, upon analyzing the unique contribution of each subscale to the statistical 
significance of the model, the Authoritarianism subscale was the only significant 
predictor, controlling for the three other subscales (p = .001). With a 1 unit increase in 
scores on the Authoritarianism subscale, there was an increase of 13.69 for IDA-R scores. 
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This indicates that as participants became more authoritarian in their views on the 
mentally ill, they also had less support for the insanity defense. The social restrictiveness 
subscale was not related to scores on the IDA-R (p = .95) as was hypothesized. 
Unexpectedly, the CMHI subscale was marginally significant, controlling for all other 
subscales (p = .05). With a 1 unit increase in scores on the CMHI subscale, there was a 
decrease of 6.76 for IDA-R scores. This indicates that more positive views about the 
integration of the mentally ill into one’s community were associated with more positive 
attitudes about the insanity defense.   
Hypothesis 3. In order to determine if the relationship between insanity defense 
attitudes and verdict decisions will be moderated by implicit associations between 
dangerousness and mental illness, a binary logistic regression with moderation was 
completed. Goodness of Fit indices indicate that this model fits significantly better than 
that of the null model (c2(3) = 81.08, p < .001). Controlling for the IATxIDA-R 
interaction and IAT scores, IDA-R scores significantly predicted Guilty verdicts (B= .09, 
SE= 0.01, Exp(B)= 1.09, Wald CHI(1)=44.25, p < .001). However, both scores on the 
IAT (B= .44, SE= 0.79, Exp(B)= 1.55, Wald CHI(1)= 0.31, p = .58) and the interaction 
term ((B= -0.002, SE= 0.01, Exp(B)= 0.998, Wald CHI(1)= 0.04, p = .85) did not 
significantly contribute to the model, and are therefore not predictive of jurors’ verdicts. 
This indicates that, contrary to the hypothesis, implicit bias as measured by the IAT does 
not moderate the relationship between scores on the IDA-R and verdict decisions.  
 Hypothesis 4. To determine if, when they are considered simultaneously, implicit 
and explicit attitude measures will account for significantly more variability in jurors’ 
verdicts in an insanity case than when either is considered alone, a hierarchical logistic 
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regression was completed. The four CAMI subscales were entered as the independent 
variable at Level 1, IDA-R total scores were entered at Level 2, and Z-transformed scores 
on the IAT were entered at Level 3. Verdict choice was entered as the dependent 
variable. All results for this analysis can be found in Table 4. 
Table 4  
Hierarchical Logistic Regression with IAT D-Scores (Z-Transformed), IDA-R Total 
Scores, and the CAMI Subscales as Predictors of Verdict Decision (Guilty v. NGRI) 
(N=181).  
Goodness of fit indices indicate all models fit significantly better than the null model, but 
model 3 did not differ significantly from model 2 (p = .13). In model 1, the subscales of 
the CAMI did not significantly predict jurors’ verdicts. In model 2, with a 1 unit increase 
in participants’ scores on the IDA-R and controlling for all four subscales of the CAMI, 
participants were 1.09 times more likely to choose a verdict of guilty (p < .001). In model 
3, controlling for all other variables in model 3, the IDA-R remained the only significant 
predictor of Guilty verdicts (p < .001). With a 1 unit increase in IDA-R scores, 
participants were 1.09 times more likely to choose a verdict of guilty. However,  
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overall, model 3 did not significantly differ from model 2 in terms of model fit, 
and no other predictors other than the IDA-R significantly contributed to the model. 
We had expected that explicit and implicit attitudes would account for more 
variance than either considered alone, but this hypothesis was not supported.  Implicit 
attitudes did not account for independent variance above and beyond the explicit 
measures. 
Discussion 
Do implicit biases play an important- and distinct- role in jurors’ judgments 
of insanity?  When considered separately from explicit attitude measures of bias against 
the mentally ill and insanity defense attitudes, jurors’ implicit associations significantly 
predicted their verdict decisions (See: Results- Hypothesis 1). People who associated the 
mentally ill with danger were more likely to choose a verdict of Guilty. However, the 
influence of implicit associations became non-significant when explicit attitudes about 
the insanity defense and community attitudes about the mentally ill were considered in 
the same model with implicit attitudes (See: Results- Hypothesis 4, Model 3). Explicit 
insanity defense attitudes seem to be the strongest predictor of insanity defense verdict 
decisions over and above explicit community attitudes about the mentally ill and implicit 
associations.  
These findings do not mean that implicit associations other than dangerousness 
and mental illness will not predict jurors’ verdict decisions. Levinson and colleagues 
(2010) discussed the merits of developing a “law specific measure of bias” that looks at a 
more direct association between a target group and a verdict decision (p. 12). The 
Guilty/Not Guilty IAT they developed observed participants’ associations between race 
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(Black and White) and Guilty and Not Guilty verdicts. They found that there was a 
significant implicit association between Black and Guilty, which ultimately showed an 
influence on judgments of ambiguous evidence in a priming/vignette task (Levinson et 
al., 2010). One other important finding from Levinson and colleagues (2010) was the 
incorporation of another variation of the Race IAT with unpleasant and pleasant attribute 
words. When both IATs where entered into a regression model to predict judgments of 
evidence, both remained significant. Levinson and colleagues posit that this is due to both 
IATs measuring separate, distinct constructs. This assertion is further supported by a lack 
of correlation between both IATs. 
The development of an IAT that specifically looks at the association of guilty 
with mental illness may be a better predictor of verdicts in an insanity case than the 
variation of the IAT used in this study. Additionally, a variation of the IAT that focuses 
on legal and non-legal characteristics of insanity may be necessary to further hone in on 
associations that may influence jurors’ verdicts. 
Limitations. Data was collected from a primarily female (73.8%), white (50.5%), 
democratic (44.6%) college sample. There were potential problems with slightly skewed 
data, specifically from the CAMI scale, that may indicate the influence of a social 
desirability bias. Many questions contain controversial concepts or ideas, and participants 
may not choose to disclose their true attitudes about those concepts or may change their 
answers to be viewed in a more favorable light. One other potential problem with the 
CAMI is outdated stimuli/questions. Questions about deinstitutionalization were highly 
relevant in the 1970s, but more appropriate questions in 2018 may concern social 
stigmatization of mental illness, untreated mental illnesses, lack of mental healthcare, or 
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the treatment of the mentally ill in the prison system- all highly contested and debated 
ideas within recent years in America.  
One other limitation concerns the influence of multicollinearity. As depicted in 
Table 3 (See: Results- Scale and Test Reliability), all variables correlate significantly 
with one another, ranging from r = .15 to r = .80. This may influence the interpretation of 
the results, as this would violate one of the key assumptions of regression requiring lack 
of collinearity, for linear and logistic regression analyses (Berry, 1993). Analyses were 
planned out a priori, but did not take into account the potential for multicollinearity 
between variables.  
There are specific limitations to the study design that should also be addressed. 
While all questionnaires and the IAT were randomized to control for order effects, the 
vignette and verdict questionnaire were always the first stimuli encountered by 
participants. This may have unintentionally primed participants to answer questionnaires 
in a particular way based on their responses to the vignette. The integration of the IAT 
using the tools provided by IATGen is also a newer way of integrating the IAT into 
online Psychological research, and general caution when using a new tool may be 
necessary. The use of the IAT in online research is also potentially problematic. Internet 
connections or computer speed may differ by participant, which could influence the 
reaction time of participants. Additionally, online studies can be completed anywhere, 
and the environment is uncontrolled by the researcher. Participants may have been 
distracted while completing the task, or may have answered questionnaire questions 
quickly to receive research credit with no penalty. While those participants were likely 
 
 
 28 
excluded after the attention check question was taken into account, participants that did 
this may have gone unnoticed. 
Conclusion 
While implicit associations about people with mental illnesses being dangerous 
did not significantly contribute to a model predicting jurors’ verdicts in an insanity case, 
explicit attitudes did. Jurors’ explicit insanity defense attitudes accounted for 44% of the 
variability in verdict decisions, with participants being 1.09 times more likely to choose a 
verdict of guilty with every 1 unit increase in IDA-R scores. Consistent with the a priori 
hypotheses, these results show that as participants’ attitudes about the insanity defense 
became more negative, they were more likely to choose the more punitive guilty verdict 
overall.  
Biases related to jurors’ existing explicit attitudes enter the courtroom, and while 
potential priming effects should be considered for this case and study (see: Limitations), 
this is just one example of how attitudes enter the courtroom with jurors. More 
importantly, community attitudes about the mentally ill did not predict verdicts when 
insanity defense attitudes and implicit attitudes were added to a regression model. There 
are specific attitudes concerning the insanity defense and the use/misuse of the insanity 
defense that appear to influence mock jurors asked to make decisions in insanity cases. 
Future research should consider attitudes in more real-life contexts (e.g. real jurors 
making decisions in insanity cases), include more realistic stimuli (e.g. simulated and 
videotaped court trials), and look at other potential influences that may lead to more bias 
against choosing an insanity verdict in an insanity case or negative attitudes against the 
mentally ill (e.g. media exposure). 
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Trial Transcript 
A.H. v. Miller 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alleged Crime: Second-degree murder  
Victim:  Alex Hughes 
Defendant: Jordan Miller  
D.O.B.: March 6th, 1989  
Arrested:  December 10th, 2014 
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Judge’s Opening Instructions to the Jury 
 
At the end of the trial I will give you detailed guidance on the law and on how you will 
go about reaching your decision. But now I simply want to generally explain how the trial 
will proceed. 
This criminal case has been brought by the State. I will sometimes refer to the 
government as the Prosecution. Mr. Miller is represented by his attorney, called the 
Defense. 
 
The indictment charges the defendant with the second-degree murder of Mr. Alex 
Hughes. The indictment is simply the description of the charge made by the state 
government against the defendant; it is not evidence of guilt or anything else. The 
defendant is presumed innocent. He may not be found guilty unless you determine that 
the government has proved his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
You are to consider all the evidence received in this trial. It will be up to you to decide 
what evidence to believe and how much of any witness's testimony to accept or reject.  
After you have heard all the evidence on both sides, the Prosecution and the Defense will 
each be given time for their final arguments. 
 
It is important that you wait until all the evidence is received and you have heard my 
instructions on the controlling rules of law before you reach your verdict.  
 
With that introduction, Prosecution you may present the opening statement for the 
government.  
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Prosecution Opening Statement 
 
On the night of December 10th, 2014, Jordan Miller stabbed and killed Alex Hughes. The 
facts meet the elements of second-degree murder; this is not in dispute by either side. The 
defendant further, by his own admission, knew that he was committing murder, and that 
murder is illegal. Thus, his action and admission satisfy all of the elements necessary to 
convict him of second-degree murder.  
 
The reason we are here today is to determine how the defendant is going to be held 
responsible for his actions. In pleading Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, the Defense 
actually assumes the burden of proof. It is true that the Prosecution always assumes the 
burden of proof in establishing guilt versus innocence, because the defendant is assumed 
to be innocent until proven guilty. However, the law has established that the defendant is 
assumed to be mentally intact unless the Defense can prove otherwise. In other words, the 
burden for proving criminal responsibility rests with the Defense, not with the 
Prosecution. In this case, the Defense would have you believe that at the time of the 
offense, the defendant, Mr. Miller, was extremely mentally ill. But while you’re listening 
to this testimony, I urge you to remember that the simplest explanation tends to be the 
right one. After you have seen the evidence you will understand that Mr. Miller is simply 
a violent person who snapped on his roommate during an argument that got so heated a 
neighbor overheard and called the police.  
 
Although you will hear psychiatric testimony that, according to the words of the 
defendant, he was mentally ill at the time of the offense, the Prosecution will show that 
actions speak louder than words in this case. You will hear testimony that the defendant 
stole money from the victim, and was preparing to skip town to avoid apprehension by 
the police. These are the actions of a person who knows he did something wrong but 
doesn’t want to answer for it. Members of the jury, while Mr. Miller may have done an 
act that you and I believe only a sick individual could do, he was mentally intact when he 
did so. Don’t accept the Defense’s farfetched fiction, the only evidence about which 
comes from a violent offender’s claims, but instead hold him responsible. We ask you to 
return the only verdict appropriate in this case, Guilty. 
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Defense Opening Statement 
 
Members of the jury, Jordan Miller suffers from a very severe mental illness known as 
paranoid schizophrenia. The composed, seemingly rational person you see before you is a 
product of anti-psychotic medication.  However, you have all heard the idiom, ‘never 
judge a book by its cover.’  To judge the inner workings of Mr. Miller’s mind and mental 
illness based on his external appearance while he is on anti-psychotic medication is a 
grave mistake. You will hear medical testimony showing that the defendant has been 
positively diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia.   
 
Mr. Miller’s actions were, in his mind, truly justified. The rationality of his belief, given 
his diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, is not the legal question to be decided here 
today. If a person kills another under a delusion that the salvation of the human race 
depends on it, then his action might be ‘legally wrong’, but it is not ‘wrong’ if we mean 
‘morally wrong’. The law is clear about this, members of the jury. A mental disease 
caused him to think that killing another person was the only option. If you, the jury, feel 
that Mr. Miller was not in his right mind and that he believed his actions were morally 
justified, then you must find that the defendant Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity. 
 
To return a verdict of Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity you do not need to understand 
what he believed; surely, no sane person would believe that his loved ones have been 
replaced by alien imposters. What you do need to understand is why he believed what he 
did. The answer to that point is a severe mental illness or disease known as paranoid 
schizophrenia. It was only because of this mental illness that he stabbed Mr. Hughes. 
Keeping these facts in mind, the Defense calls on you to return a verdict of Not Guilty by 
Reason of Insanity.  
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Prosecution Witness, Officer Mark Hanes 
 
Prosecuting Attorney: Can you please state your name and occupation?   
Hanes: My name is Mark Hanes, and I am the police officer who was the first to arrive 
on scene on the day in question. I was also the officer that later arrested Jordan Miller.  
 
Prosecuting Attorney: Can you please describe the events that took place on the evening 
of December 10th?   
Hanes: At approximately 8:40 pm I responded to a 911 call from a neighbor about a 
disturbance at the apartment of Alex Hughes and Jordan Miller. When I arrived, the door 
was open, and the victim, Mr. Hughes, was lying on the floor in the kitchen. I could see 
that the Mr. Hughes had lost a lot of blood, and I immediately called for medical 
assistance. Mr. Hughes was pronounced dead shortly after arriving at the hospital, and the 
cause of death was noted as multiple stab wounds to the neck and chest.  
 
Prosecuting Attorney: What happened next?  
Hanes: We interviewed the neighbor who had called 911. We learned from this person 
that Mr. Hughes had a roommate, Jordan Miller. 
 
Prosecuting Attorney: Was the defendant, Jordan Miller, there at that time? 
Hanes:  No he was not.  
 
Prosecuting Attorney: When and where did you find Mr. Miller?  
Hanes: At approximately 9:15 we found Mr. Miller at the home of his mother, Mrs. 
Miller. 
 
Prosecuting Attorney: Can you describe what happened next? 
Hanes: We arrived at the home of Mrs. Miller, and identified ourselves as police officers. 
Mrs. Miller indicated that Mr. Miller was in his childhood bedroom. When we went to his 
room, it was evident the defendant was quickly attempting to pack some belongings. We 
let Mr. Miller know that we needed to ask him some questions pertaining to Alex 
Hughes. 
 
Prosecuting Attorney:  Did the defendant comply with your instructions?  
Hanes:  No he did not. Mr. Miller attempted to flee through the bedroom window, which 
was on the ground level of the house. At that time we apprehended Mr. Miller and took 
him in for questioning. 
 
Prosecuting Attorney: Did you find anything of note at Mrs. Miller’s home? 
Hanes: Yes. We found a butcher’s knife, which we later identified as the murder 
weapon. Mr. Miller had cleaned the knife in the bathroom sink. We also recovered a 
wallet, which contained $200 cash and several cards; it belonged to the victim, Mr. 
Hughes.  
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Prosecuting Attorney: So, to summarize, Mr. Miller was attempting to pack his 
belongings, and to avoid capture?  
Hanes: Yes.  
 
 
Defense Cross-examination:    
 
Defense Attorney: What was Mr. Miller’s demeanor at the time you arrived at his 
house?      
Hanes:  He seemed frantic, and unsettled by sudden police presence.  
 
Defense Attorney : Did he say anything?     
Hanes:  He shouted something to the effect of: “Get away from me, don’t let them take 
me.”   
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Defense Witness, Dr. Devin Cassady 
 
Defense Attorney: Can you please state your name and occupation for the court?    
Cassady:  I’m Dr. Devin Cassady. I’m a psychologist working at the Forensic Mental 
Health Institute.    
 
Defense Attorney:  What are your credentials? 
Cassady:  I earned my Ph.D. in clinical psychology and later became board-certified in 
forensic psychology by the American Board of Professional Psychology. I’ve been a 
forensic psychologist for over 20 years now. 
 
Defense Attorney:  Have you spoken extensively with the defendant, Jordan Miller?  
Cassady: Yes. I conducted a full psychological assessment of Mr. Miller. 
 
Defense Attorney: What did you learn from this assessment? 
Cassady: Based on a psychological and medical history, a standardized questionnaire, 
and my own more detailed interview, it is my professional opinion that Mr. Miller meets 
the diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia, paranoid type. 
 
Defense Attorney: Can you describe for the courts what exactly ‘schizophrenia’ is?  
Cassady:  Schizophrenia is a severe brain disorder in which people interpret reality 
abnormally. Schizophrenia may result in some combination of hallucinations, delusions, 
and extremely disordered thinking and behavior. Hallucinations involve perceiving 
something with one of your five senses when that something isn’t really there, such as 
hearing voices when no one is actually speaking.  Delusions are fixed, false beliefs - 
believing something that isn’t true, a firm belief that can’t be altered even in the face of 
proof..  The origins of schizophrenia are not yet fully understood by scientists, but its 
potential debilitating effects are well documented.  
 
Defense Attorney:  Could you please tell the jury some details about how someone is 
diagnosed with schizophrenia, and what that means? 
Cassady: Well, first you must rule out other mental health disorders and determine that 
the symptoms aren't due to substance abuse, medication, or a medical condition. In 
addition, a person must have at least two of a specific set of symptoms outlined in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder (also called the ‘DSM’), and those 
symptoms would be present for most of the time during a one-month period, with some 
level of disturbance being present over six months. We look for things like delusions, 
hallucinations, disorganized speech (indicating disorganized thinking), and extremely 
disorganized behavior. 
 
Defense Attorney:  What did you learn, during your assessment, about Mr. Miller’s 
behavior on the day in question?  
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Cassady:  Mr. Miller suffers from what is called “Capgras Delusion”, a relatively rare 
type of delusion that can occur in patients with paranoid schizophrenia. The key feature 
of this delusion is that the patient believes that his loved ones have been replaced by 
identical looking imposters. Mr. Miller indicated to me that he believed that an alien 
imposter had replaced his roommate. Further, he stated he believed the alien imposter had 
transplanted a chip into his brain. This chip, Mr. Miller believed, was responsible for his 
hearing of Mr. Hughes’s voice even when Mr. Hughes was not present. Mr. Miller told 
me he suspected that aliens were conspiring to take over the planet, and that the Mr. 
Hughes imposter was attempting to extract information from his mind. He remarked to 
me that he began to suspect this was the case a couple of months prior, when he came 
home to find that Mr. Hughes had moved the TV to a different spot in the room. 
 
Defense Attorney: In your discussions with Mr. Miller about the night in question, what 
did he tell you?     
Cassady: He recalled that he and Mr. Hughes were talking in the kitchen, and that he 
heard a knock on the door. He believed that Mr. Hughes intended to take him away to a 
secret facility that night, and that he had to kill him to get away.  
 
Defense Attorney: In your opinion, is Mr. Miller trying to mislead you into believing he 
has schizophrenia?     
Cassady:  No I do not. Mr. Miller presented with classic symptoms of schizophrenia, and 
in particular, Capgras delusion.  
 
Prosecution Cross-Examination  
 
Prosecuting Attorney:   Are you an expert in deception, Dr. Cassady?  
Cassady:  No, I am not. But I have many years experience treating real illnesses, and the 
ability to detect malingering is part of the job. 
 
Prosecuting Attorney: Is that because people sometimes lie, and try to trick their doctor 
into diagnosing them with an illness? 
Cassady:  It’s a possibility, but to my knowledge it is not all that common. Capgras 
Delusion specifically is not necessarily well known to most people, so it wouldn’t really 
be something one would fake easily. 
 
Prosecuting Attorney:  But, wasn’t your diagnosis just based on what the defendant told 
you, after some time had passed following the incident?  
Cassady:  No. I conducted a full psychological assessment. From this assessment, which 
included a retrospective examination of records from earlier in Mr. Miller’s life - 
including records from the time of the crime - it is my opinion that Mr. Miller’s behavior 
was consistent with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. 
 
Prosecuting Attorney:  But in fact, you didn’t even interview Mr. Miller until two full 
weeks after the crime had occurred, isn’t that right?  
Cassady:  Yes that’s correct.  
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Prosecuting Attorney:  Do you think that is enough time for someone to research the 
symptoms of schizophrenia, or research the insanity defense?  
Cassady: I don’t really know – I couldn’t speak to the defendant’s activities during that 
time. 
 
Prosecuting Attorney:  Yet you can be confident about his mental state at the time of the 
crime? That he has this bizarre, specific delusion based only on a description of his 
activities?  
Cassady:  I conducted a full psychological assessment. That means that I had to take into 
account a lot of factors, not just Mr. Miller’s word. I looked for things like certain speech 
patterns, emotional expression, thinking, and perception spanning the months leading up 
to the incident and at the time of assessment. We’re not just looking for what patients say, 
but looking too at other records as collateral sources that document how they patients 
behave over time – it’s not as simple as just making up stories. 
 
Prosecuting Attorney:  So, you’re saying that the victim believed aliens replaced his 
roommate and he had to escape quickly, but he still felt he had time to take the victim’s 
wallet? Was that part of this ‘delusion’ as well?  
Cassady: The point is that Mr. Miller’s behaviors were erratic, frantic, because he was 
under the influence of paranoid delusions. For example, he indicated that if the police 
captured him, the aliens could get to him easily. Although the behavior is irrational to a 
person who is well, it is reasonable to suspect that taking the wallet somehow played into 
those delusions.  
 
Prosecuting Attorney:  Speaking of mental health history, to your knowledge, has the 
defendant ever been hospitalized for paranoid delusions before the incident?  
Cassady: No he has not. 
 
Prosecuting Attorney:  Thank you Dr. Cassady, that’s all I have for you today.  
 
Defense Re-direct 
 
Defense Attorney: Dr. Cassady, is it surprising to you that Mr. Miller would not have 
spent time in a mental health facility? 
Cassady: Not necessarily. Among men, onset of schizophrenia typically occurs during 
early to mid 20’s. Even if Mr. Miller, who was 25 at the time of the alleged crime, began 
experiencing disturbances before the incident, he would not likely have understood the 
need to seek treatment. Having moved out of his family home, his family would not have 
realized the need to intervene either.  
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Prosecution Closing Statement 
 
Mr. Hughes woke up on December 10th, excited to finish his last exam before the 
holidays and soon go home to friends and family. He was a good student, and had many 
exciting plans in store, but instead, his life was cut short. I would like to remind you, 
ladies and gentlemen, that Mr. Miller does not deny intentionally ending Mr. Hughes’s 
life. So, you don’t need to take my word for it, instead you can take this information 
directly from the defendant. The disturbing truth is that Mr. Miller is a dangerous, cold-
blooded killer. Frustrated with his roommate, he snapped and violently silenced Mr. 
Hughes. He knew that it was illegal, and he knew he would get in trouble. We can clearly 
see this because he took some quick cash from the victim, fled the scene, and even 
cleaned the murder weapon. Once he got caught red-handed he had to come up with a 
good story. Members of the jury, do not fall for his fanciful story. What is likely: that the 
defendant suddenly experienced paranoid delusions even though we have no evidence of 
this? The defense is so insistent that these outlandish beliefs explain Mr. Miller’s 
behavior, and yet you didn’t hear from a single witness who could attest to any strange 
behavior in the months leading up to the crime. Is it more plausible that he is just a 
violent person who lost his cool when he argued with his roommate one too many times? 
Not one piece of evidence was introduced, besides the defendant’s own account, that he 
had a mental disease at the time of the event. What we do have is overwhelming evidence 
of second-degree murder: the body of Mr. Hughes, a murder weapon, the defendant’s 
belongings in Mr. Miller’s room, and even a direct admission. While the forensic 
psychologist you heard from might not be able to tell when someone is faking an illness, 
I have every confidence that you can, members of the jury, and that you will return the 
correct verdict in this case: Guilty.  
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Defense Closing Statement 
 
This is a very tragic case, ladies and gentlemen; there is no doubt that. Mr. Miller also 
deeply feels the loss of his best friend and roommate, Mr. Hughes. The real culprit here is 
mental illness. We have shown you beyond a shadow of a doubt that Mr. Miller did not 
know his act was wrong. You heard testimony from a very experienced doctor describing 
an undisputed diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. The Prosecution would have you 
believe that because Mr. Miller’s account is so bizarre, it can only be a piece of fiction. 
But after hearing Dr. Cassady’s testimony, you can understand that the reason these 
beliefs sound so far-fetched to you or me is because they came from a mind that is 
unwell. Don’t fall into the trap of attempting to understand Mr. Miller’s delusion. The 
Prosecution is trying to distract you from the real legal issue at hand: namely, whether 
Mr. Miller believed these things because of a mental illness. Trust in an expert’s full 
assessment that was based on a lot more information than you’ve heard in this case. It 
was based on years of training, experience, and study of mental health as well as other 
sources in Mr. Miller’s history. Let us not punish Mr. Miller for being the unlucky 
recipient of a mental disease that consumed his life and left him in fear for it. What Mr. 
Miller really needs to receive is mental health care from trained medical professionals 
who understand how the brain works. I trust you, members of the jury, to follow the law 
in this case. The law tells us that if a person did not knowingly and intentionally commit 
a crime, then you must find so, plain and simple. This doesn’t mean he can just walk out 
of here, it just means that we recognize something that was so beyond his control. This 
isn’t a case of evil, but rather it is a case of illness. While Mr. Miller did not have the 
choice to act rationally at the time of the crime, you have a choice here and now; the 
rational one is to find the defendant Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity.  
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Judge’s Closing Instructions to the Jury 
 
The defendant is charged in the indictment with murder in the second degree in violation 
of Section 1111 of Title 18 of the State Code.  In order for the defendant to be found 
guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond 
a reasonable doubt: 
 
First, the defendant unlawfully killed Alex Hughes; and 
Second, the defendant killed Alex Hughes with malice aforethought. 
 
To kill with malice aforethought means to kill either deliberately and intentionally or 
recklessly and with extreme disregard for human life.  
 
If you conclude that the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime charged, you must then consider whether the defendant 
should be found “Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity.” Under the law, a person is not 
criminally liable for his conduct while insane. Insanity is therefore a defense to the crime 
charged. The defendant has presented evidence of insanity at the time he committed the 
crime charged.  
 
For you to return a verdict of Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI), the defendant 
must prove 1) that he suffered from a severe mental disease or defect when he committed 
the crime; and (2) that, as a result of this mental disease or defect, he was not able to 
understand what he was doing or to understand that it was wrong.  
Insanity may be temporary or permanent. You may consider evidence of the defendant's 
mental condition before, during, and after the crime, in deciding whether he was legally 
insane at the time of the crime.  
Unlike other aspects of a criminal trial, the defendant has the burden of proving an 
insanity defense. The defendant does not have to prove insanity beyond a reasonable 
doubt, however, but only by clear and convincing evidence. Clear and convincing 
evidence is evidence that makes it highly probable that the defendant was insane. You 
should render a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity" if you find, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the defendant was insane when he committed the crime 
charged.  
Although the defendant has raised the issue of insanity, the government still has the 
burden of proving all of the essential elements of the offense charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Remember that there are three possible verdicts in this case: Guilty, 
Not Guilty, and Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity. 
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APPENDIX C 
MEASURES 
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Attention and Comprehension Checks 
 
Each participant received attention and comprehension checks to ensure they read the 
case vignette fully. Participants were excluded if they failed to answer Attention Check 1 
correctly. 
 
1. I am paying attention. As such, I am marking the second option below. 
a. Option one- He said it. 
b. Option two- I was told to pick this one. 
c. Option three- They didn’t know. 
d. Option four- She did it. 
2. What will happen to the defendant after the trial if he is found Guilty? 
a. He will be immediately released back into the community. 
b. He will go to prison to serve his sentence, where he might receive 
psychiatric treatment, before he is released back into the community. 
c. He will go to a secure psychiatric hospital for treatment until he is no 
longer mentally ill or dangerous, then he will be released back into the 
community. 
d. He will go to a secure psychiatric hospital for treatment until the end of his 
sentence. If he is no longer mentally ill but still dangerous, he will be 
transferred to prison to serve the remainder of his sentence before he is 
released back into the community. 
3. What will happen to the defendant after the trial if he is found Not Guilty? 
a. He will be immediately released back into the community. 
b. He will go to prison to serve his sentence, where he might receive 
psychiatric treatment, before he is released back into the community. 
c. He will go to a secure psychiatric hospital for treatment until he is no 
longer mentally ill or dangerous, then he will be released back into the 
community. 
d. He will go to a secure psychiatric hospital for treatment until the end of his 
sentence. If he is no longer mentally ill but still dangerous, he will be 
transferred to prison to serve the remainder of his sentence before he is 
released back into the community. 
4. What will happen to the defendant after the trial if he is found Not Guilty by 
Reason of Insanity? 
a. He will be immediately released back into the community. 
b. He will go to prison to serve his sentence, where he might receive 
psychiatric treatment, before he is released back into the community. 
c. He will go to a secure psychiatric hospital for treatment until he is no 
longer mentally ill or dangerous, then he will be released back into the 
community. 
d. He will go to a secure psychiatric hospital for treatment until the end of his 
sentence. If he is no longer mentally ill but still dangerous, he will be 
transferred to prison to serve the remainder of his sentence before he is 
released back into the community. 
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Demographics 
1. What is your gender?    ___Male ___Female 
2. What is your age? ______ 
3. What do you consider to be your race or ethnicity? 
__  African American __  Hispanic (non-white) __  Pacific Islander 
__  Asian  __  Hispanic (white)   __ White 
__  Native American   __ Other (Specify______________) 
4. Have you ever served on jury duty? 
________Yes    or  _______ No 
5. What do you consider to be your political affiliation? 
__Democrat __Republican  __Independent  __Libertarian __ Other 
(Specify______) 
6. Please rate your support for the death penalty. 
1          2          3          4          5           6          7          8          9 
 Strongly Opposed                                                                                                   Strongly In Favor 
7. [For people who responded “1” or “2” to previous question] Despite your strong 
opposition to the death penalty, would you be able to set aside your beliefs and 
sentence a defendant to death if there were more aggravating circumstances 
(factors supporting death) than mitigating circumstances (factors supporting life)? 
________Yes    or  _______ No 
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Juror Questions 
To what degree do you believe the defendant has a mental illness?   
               0 - 100% _________ 
To what extent should the defendant be blamed for his actions? 
            0 - 100% _________ 
To what extent did the defendant have control of his actions?  
            0 - 100% _________                                                                         
To what degree do you believe the defendant committed the crime charged, second-degree 
murder? 
0 - 100% _________ 
Do you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime charged, 
second-degree murder? 
______ Yes             ______ No 
To what degree do you believe the Defense showed that the defendant was [insane] at the time of 
the crime?  
0 - 100% _________ 
Do you believe that the Defense showed, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant 
was [insane] at the time of the crime?   
______ Yes             ______ No 
What is your verdict? 
_____ Guilty          ______ Not Guilty        ______ [NGRI]  
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Insanity Defense Attitudes Scale- Revised 
 
On the following pages, you will find statements that express commonly held opinions 
about the insanity defense. We would like to know how much you agree or disagree with 
each of these statements. To the right of each statement is a rating scale. You may 
interpret the seven points on this scale as follows: 
______1______/_____2_____/_____3_____/_____4_____/_____5_____/_____6_____/______7______ 
 STRONGLY DISAGREE     STRONGLY AGREE 
 
After reading each statement, please circle the point on the scale that comes closest to 
saying how much you agree or disagree with the statement.  
1. I believe that people should be held responsible 
for their actions no matter what their mental 
condition. 
2. I believe that all human beings know what they 
are doing and have the power to control 
themselves. 
3. The insanity defense threatens public safety by 
telling criminals that they can get away with a 
crime if they come up with a good story about 
why they did it. 
4. I believe that mental illness can impair people’s 
ability to make logical choices and control 
themselves. 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
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5. A defendant’s degree of insanity is irrelevant: if 
he commits the crime, then he should do the 
time. 
6. The insanity defense returns disturbed, 
dangerous people to the streets. 
7. Mentally ill defendants who plead insanity have 
failed to exert enough willpower to behave 
properly like the rest of us. So, they should be 
punished for their crimes like everyone else. 
8. As a last resort, defense attorneys will 
encourage their clients to act strangely and lie 
through their teeth in order to appear “insane.”  
9. Perfectly sane killers can get away with their 
crimes by hiring high-priced lawyers and 
experts who misuse the insanity defense. 
10. The insanity plea is a loophole in the law that 
allows too many guilty people to escape 
punishment. 
11. We should punish people who commit criminal 
acts, regardless of their degree of mental 
disturbance. 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
 
 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
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12. It is wrong to punish people who commit crime 
for crazy reasons while gripped by 
uncontrollable hallucinations or delusions. 
13. Most defendants who use the insanity defense 
are truly mentally ill, not fakers. 
14. Some people with severe mental illness are out 
of touch with reality and do not understand that 
their acts are wrong. These people cannot be 
blamed and do not deserve to be punished. 
15. Many of the crazy criminals that psychiatrists 
see fit to return to the streets go on to kill again. 
16. With slick attorneys and a sad story, any 
criminal can use the insanity defense to finagle 
his way to freedom. 
17. It is wrong to punish someone for an act they 
commit because of any uncontrollable illness, 
whether it be epilepsy or mental illness. 
18. I believe that we should punish a person for a 
criminal act only if he understood the act as evil 
and then freely chose to do it. 
 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
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19. For the right price, psychiatrists will probably 
manufacture a “mental illness” for any criminal 
to convince the jury that he is insane. 
20.  How strongly do you feel about the insanity 
defense? 
21.  How personally important is your opinion on 
the insanity defense? 
22.  How much do you care about the insanity 
defense?  
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Community Attitudes Towards Mentally Ill (CAMI) Scale  
The following statements express various opinions about mental illness and the mentally 
ill. The mentally ill refers to people needing treatment for mental disorders but who are 
capable of independent living outside a hospital. Please circle the response which most 
accurately describes your reaction to each statement. It's your first reaction which is 
important. Don't be concerned if some statements seem similar to ones you have 
previously answered. Please be sure to answer all statements.  
SA (1) = Strongly Agree, A (2) = Agree, N (3) = Neutral, D (4) = Disagree, SD (5) = 
Strongly Disagree 
a. As soon as a person shows signs of mental disturbance, he should be hospitalized.  
SA A N D SD  
b. More tax money should be spent on the care and treatment of the mentally ill.  
SA A N D SD  
c. The mentally ill should be isolated from the rest of the community.  
SA A N D SD  
d. The best therapy for many mental patients is to be part of a normal community.  
SA A N D SD  
e. Mental illness is an illness like any other.  
SA A N D SD  
f. The mentally ill are a burden on society. 
SA A N D SD  
g. The mentally ill are far less of a danger than most people suppose.  
SA A N D SD  
h. Locating mental health facilities in a residential area downgrades the neighbourhood.  
SA A N D SD  
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i. There is something about the mentally ill that makes it easy to tell them from normal 
people.  
SA A N D SD  
 
j. The mentally ill have for too long been the subject of ridicule.  
SA A N D SD  
k. A woman would be foolish to marry a man who has suffered from mental illness, even 
though he seems fully recovered.  
SA A N D SD  
l. As far as possible mental health services should be provided through community- based 
facilities.  
SA A N D SD  
m. Less emphasis should be placed on protecting the public from the mentally ill.  
SA A N D SD  
n. Increased spending on mental health services is a waste of tax dollars.  
SA A N D SD  
o. No one has the right to exclude the mentally ill from their neighbourhood.  
SA A N D SD  
p. Having mental patients living within residential neighbourhoods might be good 
therapy, but the risks to residents are too great.  
SA A N D SD  
q. Mental patients need the same kind of control and discipline as a young child.  
SA A N D SD  
r. We need to adopt a far more tolerant attitude toward the mentally ill in our society.  
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SA A N D SD  
 
s. I would not want to live next door to someone who has been mentally ill.  
SA A N D SD  
t. Residents should accept the location of mental health facilities in their neighbourhood 
to serve the needs of the local community.  
SA A N D SD  
u. The mentally ill should not be treated as outcasts of society.  
SA A N D SD  
v. There are sufficient existing services for the mentally ill.  
SA A N D SD  
w. Mental patients should be encouraged to assume the responsibilities of normal life.  
SA A N D SD  
x. Local residents have good reason to resist the location of mental health services in their 
neighbourhood.  
SA A N D SD  
y. The best way to handle the mentally ill is to keep them behind locked doors.  
SA A N D SD  
z. Our mental hospitals seem more like prisons than like places where the mentally ill can 
be cared for.  
SA A N D SD  
aa. Anyone with a history of mental problems should be excluded from taking public 
office.  
SA A N D SD  
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bb. Locating mental health services in residential neighbourhoods does not endanger 
local residents.  
SA A N D SD  
 
cc. Mental hospitals are an outdated means of treating the mentally ill.  
SA A N D SD  
dd. The mentally ill do not deserve our sympathy.  
SA A N D SD  
ee. The mentally ill should not be denied their individual rights.  
SA A N D SD  
ff. Mental health facilities should be kept out of residential neighbourhoods.  
SA A N D SD  
gg. One of the main causes of mental illness is a lack of self-discipline and will power.  
SA A N D SD  
hh. We have the responsibility to provide the best possible care for the mentally ill.  
SA A N D SD  
ii. The mentally ill should not be given any responsibility.  
SA A N D SD  
jj. Residents have nothing to fear from people coming into their neighbourhood to obtain 
mental health services. 
SA A N D SD  
kk. Virtually anyone can become mentally ill.  
SA A N D SD  
ll. It is best to avoid anyone who has mental problems.  
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SA A N D SD  
mm. Most women who were once patients in a mental hospital can be trusted as baby 
sitters. 
SA A N D SD  
nn. It is frightening to think of people with mental problems living in residential 
neighbourhoods.  
SA A N D SD  
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Implicit Association Test (IAT) 
 
Category Labels: Mentally Ill, Physically Ill, Harmless, Dangerous 
Stimuli: Schizophrenia, Diabetes, Dangerous, Harmless, Bipolar Disorder, Appendicitis, 
Unsafe, Safe, Depression, Cerebral Palsy, Violent, Peaceful, Obsessive-Compulsive 
Disorder, Multiple Sclerosis, Aggressive, Gentle 
 
Example: Sample Trial from IAT 
 
Instructions for Participants, Category Stimuli is Randomized 
 
Example of Stimuli Placement 
 
 
 
 
 
 62 
Example of Incorrect Response 
 
 
Part 2 
 
 
Part 3(Real Trial) 
 
Part 4 (Practice Trial) 
 
 
Part 5 
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Part 6 (Practice Trial) 
 
Part 7 (Real Trial) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
